1.At the beginning of 2023, the strategic thinkers and analysts in the United States (US)and the world over , had professed that there will be a shift of US strategic interests from the Middle East (ME) due to a reduced dependence on oil, to the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese factor and an increased US- China rivalry, supplemented by alternate sources of energy contributed to this conclusion. In a matter of few months this myth was falsified after an unprecedentedly attack by Hamas inside the Israeli territory and a massive retaliation by Israel. This conflict not only goes on even after a year but has engulfed some other countries of the Region. A transcontinental region including parts of Eurasia and Africa, the Middle East includes 17 countries that share common factors like ethnic groups, geographic features, religious beliefs and culture. The Middle East is a region with a fascinating history that goes back to the earliest known civilizations and empires. Its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of continents has made it a battle ground for empires, religions and ideologies .As a result, conflicts have raged in the Middle East for centuries that has shaped boundaries, politics, culture and the lives of the millions. It may be pertinent to understand the genesis of the various conflicts in the historical context to understand the nature of the present crises.
Historical Perspective
The history of the conflicts in the ME traces back to ancient eras, marked by the rise and fall of mighty empires like the Babylonians, Persians, Greeks and Romans. These powerful civilizations left behind a legacy of conquests, assimilation and cultural exchange. The shifting borders of these empires laid the foundation for modern geopolitical rivalries and territorial disputes. Religion has played a major role in shaping the landscape of conflicts in the ME. The rise of Islam in the 7th century brought about a new era of conquest and expansion, as Arab armies swept across the Region, establishing vast caliphates and spreading Islamic civilization. The Sunni-Shia divide, dating back to the early days of Islam, led to further tension and conflict. The two sects of Islam (Sunni and Shia) have been at odds in various nations ever since.
The 19th and 20th centuries witnessed the emergence of European colonial powers in the ME, as the Ottoman Empire weakened and collapsed. Britain and France carved up the region through the secret wartime treaty, Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, drawing arbitrary borders that disregarded ethnic, religious and tribal realities. This colonial legacy sowed the seeds of future conflicts, creating artificial nations and fueling nationalist movements. .During the Cold War, the ME became a battleground for the superpower rivalry as the US and the Soviet Union vied for influence and control. Proxy conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, further destabilized the region, exacerbating ethnic, religious and sectarian tensions. The legacy of these conflicts continues to shape the political landscape of ME today.
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 remains one of the most contentious issues in the ME. The Arab-Israel conflict, born out of competing claims to the land, has resulted in decades of wars, displacement and suffering for in particular Palestinians. The failure to resolve this conflict has had farreaching implications for regional stability. Fueling anti-Israeli sentiments and radicalization. The Arab Spring of 2011-12, a series of pro-democracy uprisings allegedly perpetrated by Israel in concert with the West has contributed to aggravated violence, instability and civil war in countries like Syria, Libya and Yemen. The failure of nascent democracies to take root has left a power vacuum exploited by extremist groups and regional powers. The present ME remains a volatile and complex region, grappling with a myriad of challenges, including terrorism, sectarianism, authoritarianism and foreign interventions. The US intervention in the Gulf War of 1991 further destabilized the region and failed to construct a durable regional security order. In 2003 the US and its coalition invaded Iraq, accusing Saddam Hussain of developing weapons of mass destruction, later denied by then US Minister of State General Colin Powell. The rise of potent non-state actors such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah and Houthis of Yemen have further created threats to regional security and stability.
The Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict has its roots in 1932 beginning with the rule of King Saud, claiming to be the Muslim representative involving the Sunni Wahhabi ideology and guardian of the holy cities. Iran on the other hand, post 1979 Iranian Revolution terms itself as the protector of the Shia Islam. This marked the beginning of the proxy conflict as it undermined Saudi Arabia’s image as a leader of the Muslim World. Another important development in 1979 was the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca where the extremist insurgents protested against westernization of the monarchy and demanded an overthrow of the house of Saud. Though the crisis was overwhelmed by the state, the monarchy took over their demands for stricter Islamization policies to re-establish its Islamic legitimacy. This led to a further differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran and an aspirations to spread own brand of Islam in various states to establish likeminded blocs.
The Ongoing Conflicts
Near the dawn of 7 October 2023, the militant group Hamas began an assault from Gaza into Israel. As a pre-emption, drones were used to destroy the Israeli surveillance stations followed by barrages of rockets. The Hamas fighters then infiltrated into southern Israel. In an hours long, declared war, Hamas and other Gaza-based groups killed up to 1200 security personnel and civilians and took more than 250 back to Gaza as hostages. In response Israel under extreme rightist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, declared war on Hamas and started a campaign of airstrikes, a bombardment that would be one of the most intense, followed by a ground campaign that has killed more than 50,000 thousands inhabitants of Gaza over the year. Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group supported by Iran also joined in the conflict, enticing an Israeli airstrikes against its locations. Others in Iran’s network of armed groups, notably the Houthis of Yemen disrupted global shipping by attacking commercial vessels in Red Sea belonging to US and Israel.
On 1 April 2024, Israeli warplanes attacked an Iranian embassy compound in capital, Damascus, killing at least three senior officers including Brigadier General Zahedi and four officers overseeing Iran’s covert operations in ME. About two weeks later, in retaliation Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel, the first time it had attacked the country directly. The timings and the intensity of this attack was already known to US, Israel and other allies, resulting in interception of all the weapons. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also intercepted Iranian missiles flying over their air spaces towards Israel. The Israeli retaliation, though limited, manifested by striking Iranian defense system near Natanz, a city which is critical to country’s nuclear weapons program. These direct strikes between Iran and Israel, though a climb of the escalation ladder, fits within the longstanding framework for deterrence between the two belligerents.
Israel in a demonstration of most in human act, orchestrated exploding of thousands of pager devices operated by Hezbollah members in Lebanon, on 17 September 2024. At least 12 people were killed and 2700 injured. The next day thousands of walkie- talkie devices exploded in Lebanon, killing 20 people and wounding almost thousand, thus crippling Hezbollah communications. This campaign against Hezbollah continued by killing of their leader, Hassan Nasrallah by Israeli airstrike on 27 September in a residential building south of Beirut. Iran under an intense pressures from its militant proxies and domestic cries for revenge to avenge the deaths of Haniyeh in Tehran and Nasrallah, retaliated on 1 October by firing 180 ballistic missiles at Israel. The attacks were mostly thwarted by Israeli air defense with help from the US. Unlike the previous strike in April, there was a minimal telegraphing from Iran about its decision to launch another direct attack on Israeli territory. Israel had vowed to retaliate but its materialization and the timings are awaited. The key question is of its intensity and potential fallout, both within Iran in terms of nuclear security policy changes and across the broader region. The unconfirmed sources have disclosed that the US administration is making efforts to convince Israel not to attack Iranian Nuclear or oil sites but military targets only.
The Israel – Hamas War Likely Scenarios
As the Israel- Hamas war has been ongoing for more than a year, the prospects of peace seem less likely than ever. Despite repeated attempts by US, Egypt and Qatar to negotiate a cease-fire and hostage release deal, the conflict in Gaza remains unresolved and is now spreading across the Middle East. There are a serious risk of all-out war between Israel, Hezbollah and Iran. The scale and geographic scope of violence has dramatically increased. Although most strikes by both sides have been within a relatively narrow area along the Israel- Lebanon border, the nature of limited war between Hezbollah, Iran and Israel is rapidly changing. Israel has escalated the number of strikes and the depths of its targeting. Hezbollah too has increased strikes, although in a far more limited way than Israel. And Iran has become directly involved in the conflict by firing ballistic missiles at Israel. Israeli attacks might successfully coerce Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire and move forces away from border or they might significantly weaken Hezbollah capabilities to strike Israel. However, if negotiations fail to establish a buffer zone along the Israel- Lebanon border, there is a looming threat of a war. The escalation of the conflict could lead to significant casualties for both Hezbollah and the Israeli military, put Israeli civilians throughout the country at risk, lead to thousands of Lebanese casualties and spread to Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries. The Israeli stated objectives against Hezbollah are mainly; first, to curb, Hezbollah threat to Israel by seriously degrading their military capability, which includes disarming entire units of the Radwan force. A second Israeli objective is to resettle internally displaced population back to their habitat in northern Israel. This is not possible without the improvement of security parameter by subduing Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
In the light of the escalating violence, there are three likely scenarios for further escalation: an Israeli ground invasion, a coercive Israeli air war and a major Hezbollah escalation. Israel might conduct a major and sustained ground incursion into southern Lebanon to drive Hezbollah forces away from the Israel- Lebanon border. In essence the goal would be to re-create a buffer zone similar to Israel held from 1985 to 2000, when the cumulative weight of Hezbollah attacks led Israel to withdraw. If successful, such an operation could reduce the risk of an October-7 like incursion from Lebanon and reduce the risk of Hezbollah strikes from short-range systems into Israel. This operations might require large number of Israeli ground forces which may be a difficult proposition given the ongoing war in Gaza for over an year now. The short and long term cost of such an operation would be significant. Israeli military’s reliance on reserves would place an additional burden on the society. There are likely to be heavy casualties from the skilled and highly motivated Hezbollah fighters and possibly of the Hezbollah taking military captives. In addition a ground invasion could trigger a more massive Hezbollah rocket and missile attack deeper into Israel. The damage to Lebanon would be far more severe with Israeli forces targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese might be displaced as well. Then there is the Iran factor also which would openly support and re arm Hezbollah. An act of aggression by Israel after their history of atrocities in Gaza will entice an international backlash and condemnation. Because of these risks, Israel might use a limited ground invasion supported by an aggressive air campaign to significantly degrade Hezbollah capabilities, destroy infrastructure in the south, withdraw troops to Israel and threaten to escalate if Hezbollah continues its attacks.
The other two scenarios could be a coercive air war and Hezbollah massive retaliation aided by Iran. Israel might conduct a sustained large scale air campaign against Hezbollah and also Iran and Iran backed groups. In such an option piloted aircraft and drones would attack Hezbollah and other rocket and missile sites, ammunition stockpiles, command and control centers, leadership as well as interdict Iranian arms shipments. In contrast to current operations, far more attacks would be launched outside the border zone, especially in Shite populated parts of Beirut and Bekaa Valley. Such an operation would be much less risky as compared to the ground offensive. If successful, coercive air attack would cripple Hezbollah, its leadership and retard their ability to draw on the full strength of the organization to retaliate against Israel. In any event, Lebanese civilian population would suffer considerably because of the collateral damage of targeting Hezbollah facilities mostly located near civilian sites. This could also have severe international repercussions and condemnation given the Israeli violence against the civil population of Gaza. By not using the ground troops, Israel would be less effective at rooting Hezbollah fighters near the border who might hide underground or among civilians. The air campaign is likely to take longer than a ground attack and to be effective may have to last for weeks or even months. In another scenario, Hezbollah and Iran may opt to dramatically escalate operations against Israel emanating from stakes of credibility of their leaders and domestic pressures arising from inhuman treatments in Gaza and Lebanon by Israel. Hezbollah might consider that Israel’s operations will be unrelenting even if it does not retaliate effectively and could lose its capabilities. Given the inward stance of US in the wake of presidential election and a weak Biden administration and Iran’s direct involvement with Israel, Hezbollah and Iran could launch a sustained swarm of rocket, missile and drone assault on Israeli territory. Hezbollah goals would be both political and military. The conduct of a credible operations against Israel would offset some of the damage to its reputation by successful Israeli intelligence based attacks, besides Israeli civilian casualties would further weaken Netanyahu political position to continue with many fronts war. The risks for Hezbollah would be many, losing its fighters in ground attacks, sufferings in Lebanon from an Israeli response and a likely backlash and retardation of their recruitment etc. Hezbollah 13 October drone attack targeting an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) base south of Haifa, killing four IDF soldiers and injuring 61 others is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. The attack is part of a possible broader campaign that Hezbollah has described to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operations in southern Lebanon.
12.The most desirable option for the world peace and to end human sufferings, in particular for the conflict torn Middle East would be to mitigate a war and bring in an end to the Gaza crisis and Israel- Iran and Hezbollah confrontations. The US has engaged in a constant diplomacy to bring about a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, though it has done little to pressurize Israel to end its atrocities in Gaza. Although, US efforts have clearly failed, it has somewhat convinced Israel not to launch a preemptive strike on Hezbollah in the days after October attack. In addition, US by a tacit diplomacy and use of threats of sanctions has dissuaded Iran from increasing its direct role and may be a factor in Hezbollah’s decision so far, not to escalate to an all-out war. The back channel influence of the US over Iran is visible by the fact that in April 2024 Iran’s retaliation, Israel and U.S had a 72 hours prior warning of Iranian drone attacks. Post this attack, US even gave a statement that Iran will not further escalate and called upon Israel to limit its response against Iran. The role of the US as credible peace broker has lost importance due to its partisan approach in the favor of Israel. Even as the US has pushed for a diplomatic settlement, it has extended military and financial support to Israel, including use of its naval and air assets to deter any outside interference. Russia has supplied extensive military support to Iran and S-300 Air Defense system but appears reluctant to extend political and diplomatic support to it in war against Israel. The main reason is the recent US and NATO willingness not to deploy long range missiles in Ukraine. China remains unconcerned with the developments in the Middle East and remains focused on bilateral trade with most countries of the Middle East including Israel. In addition to US, Egypt and Qatar have also made diplomatic efforts to end the war in Gaza and to bring about a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, without any results. Despite these diplomatic initiatives, a lasting ceasefire will be difficult to achieve. The 7 October Hamas attack was a landmark event for the Israel’s government and people, exacerbating the country’s insecurity. The best that negotiators may be able to achieve is managing the escalation of violence and preventing an all-out war that devastates much of Lebanon and expands into Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries.
Consequences of the Israel- Hamas / Iran / Hezbollah Conflicts on the Region
The Hamas attacks of 7 October and the massive Israeli response, which continues unabated have considerably changed the complexion of the Israel- Palestine conflict. On the one hand, while a direct confrontation between Tehran and its closest allies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen and proIranian militants in Syria and Iraq has been contained for the time being, there is no guarantee that the situation will not evolve into a major conflict in the coming days. In addition, the safety of the shipping in the Red Sea remains under threat of Houthis and could disrupt world trade. This could have repercussions on regional scale, since this vital artery for Egypt is also very important for Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The recent events could also have implications for Saudi- Iranian relations which have recently been restored through a major diplomatic breakthrough by China. Officially nothing has been called into question but Iranian backing to the Houthis remains a prime Saudi concern. The Houthis with their potent ballistic capabilities are a threat not only to the shipping in the Red Sea but also to Saudi oil instillations. As far as Egypt is concerned, the stakes are of a completely different order. Navigation through the Suez Canal in one of the country’s main source of foreign exchange. Last year only, it accrued 8 billion Euros in revenue. A closure of the canal or a long term diversion of the shipping would be catastrophic for its already fragile economy. The fall of a drone, in resort city of Dahab near the border with Jordon, in December 2023, most likely launched by Houthis has affected the revenue generated by tourism. The foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordon have consequently joined forces to coordinate their actions.
On the Syrian side, Jordon which was the main sponsor of Damascus readmission to the League of
Arab States in May 2023, has carried out several air raids and ground incursions against drug gangs affiliated to pro-Iranian militias close to Bashar regime. Relations between the two countries are very tense and all dialogue have come to a halt. In Syria, Israel sent a strong signal to the Iranians by eliminating Redha Mussavi, a senior officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard responsible for logistics and supplies of arms and ammunition to Syria. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US led forces undermined the internal order in the country and brought about, among other things, the establishment of several pro- Iranian militias affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Quds Force. The militias were set up with the objective of driving the US and Coalition forces out of Iraq and establishing Iranian say in the country. Prominent among these militias are Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and Harkat al –Nujaba. These groups continue to use their influence on successive Iraqi governments to safeguard the Iranian interests. Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional leaders and their proxies ahead of an expected Israeli strike on Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister travelled to Bagdad on 13 October to discuss the,” special and dangerous conditions” in the Middle East with senior Iraqi leadership. He may have warned Iraqi officials against allowing Israel to use Iraqi airspace to attack Iran. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein described (Israel’s) exploitation of Iraqi airspace as totally unacceptable during a press conference with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid separately emphasized that Iraq,” will never serve as a launching pad” for attacking Iran during a meeting with the visiting Iranian Foreign Minister. According to Western media reports, Israel likely used
Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on 18 April in retaliation for the 13 April Iranian drone and missile attack on
Israel. Previous Iraqi governments have also warned Iran and the US against using the Iraq as a “launching pad” for regional conflict. The question remains on the capability of the Iraqi government to be able to deny violation of its air space to Israel, Iran or the US .In reality the government in Iraq is even unable to prevent Iranian backed groups from using its territory to target US forces and Israel.
15.Iran, anticipating a retaliation by Israel of its 1 October missile attack, finds itself at a cross road and is engaging in an diplomatic efforts with countries in the Middle East to gauge whether they can reduce the Israel’s response and if that fails help protect Tehran. Iran’s anxiety stems from uncertainty about whether the US can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear sites and oil facilities and the fact that its most important proxy militia in the region, Hezbollah has been significantly weakened by Israeli military operations in the recent weeks. The US has been consulting with Israel on how it plans to respond to Iran’s 1 October attack and have reportedly made clear they do not want Israel to target Iranian nuclear sites or oil fields. The US Gulf allies, including UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar have also expressed concerns to the US about a potential attack on Iranian oil facilities, which could create negative economic and environmental impacts for the entire region. US administration is deeply worried that the ongoing tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Iran which began this year, could spiral into a major war that pulls the US in, too. A major part of the fears is that the US influence with Israel has appeared to be steadily waning over the last year. In Gaza, Israel has increasingly degraded the US calls for avoiding civilian sufferings and calls for a restraint in Lebanon. Israel also did not consult the US before exploding thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah operatives last month or before assassinating Hezbollah Chief Nasrallah. The contours of Israeli response against Iran are as yet not clear but Israel has also not given any assurances that it would not target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Gulf States broadly are eager to stay on the sidelines of the conflict, while Iran has publically warned that any parties seen as aiding Israel will be treated as aggressors.
Conclusions
During the past two decades, Iran and its proxies (Hamas and Hezbollah) on one side and Israel on the other have held each other to a mutual deterrence. That balance of power in the Middle East is beginning to shift in a way that Iran led axis is reeling and Israel appears to have achieved significant tactical gains. Whether Israel can translate those to strategic objectives through state craft and diplomacy, remains to be seen. Iran’s influence in the region is weakening but such a change in the status quo is a process that will take a long time to materialize. A weakening of Iranian influence in the Middle East would most likely lead to the perception that the only option left for them, which could be a game-changer, is to go nuclear. Israel’s widening campaign and continued use of aggression in Gaza against the civilian population has been condemned by the international community and has angered the population in the Middle East, who are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. This makes achieving peace in the future more elusive.
Israel has been fighting in Gaza for more than a year and there has been a major destruction of Hamas brigades and a severe loss of fighters. Despite this, Israel cannot achieve its aims in Gaza because it doesn’t have a political aim, which could potentially be its Achilles’’ heel. The biggest problem for ending the war in Gaza is that Israel has no vision for an alternative governing force. In order to establish a workable peace and a” two state’ solution, Israel needs a political strategy for a government framework that leads to Palestinian self-determination and has an international and Palestinian acceptability. The outcome of the November US Presidential elections could exert influence and checks over the warring states and factions and pave the way for a lasting peace in the conflict torn Middle East. As a concluding sentence, China with its economic and political standings and cordial relations with all the involved countries in the conflicts can be a most credible peace broker in the Middle East but this option may not be allowed by the West!
(This Article is current till 16 October 2024 and reviews/ analyses are based on the chronology of the events taken place till the date.